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Abstract
Recent work in the behavioural sciences has begun to overturn the long-held belief
that human decision making is irrational, suboptimal and subject to biases. This
turn to the rational suggests that human decision making may be a better source
of ideas for constraining how machine learning problems are defined than would
otherwise be the case. One promising idea concerns human decision making
that is dependent on apparently irrelevant aspects of the choice context. Previous
work has shown that by taking into account choice context and making relational
observations, people can maximize expected value. Other work has shown that
Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) are a useful way to
formulate human-like decision problems. Here, we propose a novel POMDP model
for contextual choice tasks and show that, despite the apparent irrationalities, a
reinforcement learner can take advantage of the way that humans make decisions.
We suggest that human irrationalities may offer a productive source of inspiration
for improving the design of AI architectures and machine learning methods.
1 Introduction
Humans have long been a source of inspiration for how to build intelligent machines [1, 2]. There is
now a series of successful examples of where knowledge about the brain and mind has been used to
develop new types of Machine Learning (ML), including artificial neural networks [3], convolutional
neural networks inspired in part by the hierarchical organization of vision [4], and Reinforcement
Learning (RL) which was inspired by decision making and learning under uncertainty in humans and
other animals [5]. A more recent example is provided by the promise of the utility of uncertainty,
which has demonstrated that incorporating human-like uncertainty about object classifications can
help obtain more robust and better performing machine classification [6]. Many recent advances
have come from modeling uncertainty in ML. For example, capturing uncertainty can improve
model performance in regression and classification tasks [7, 8], estimating uncertainty can improve
deep learning algorithms [9–11], and representing the uncertainty of an agent’s policy can aid more
efficient exploration in RL [12–14]. Another example of the influence of the human sciences on ML
is how selective attention in human perception and neural information processing, has motivated
rapid progress in object recognition [15], visual object tracking [16–18], human action recognition
[19], image caption generation [20], and machine translation [21, 22]. In sum, progress on multiple
fronts suggests that human cognition offers a productive source of inspiration for improving ML.
However, perhaps not every aspect of human cognition should be emulated. One such aspect might be
human choice behavior which has generated a long list of cognitive biases [23], leading to systematic
and predictable errors. For example, humans supposedly rely too heavily on the first piece of evidence
gathered (the anchoring bias), they heavily weight decisions towards more recent information (the
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availability bias), and they overweight the value of outcomes that are expected to definitely occur (the
certainty bias). At the last count, in a decision-making textbook, [24] lists 53 irrationalities. Together,
these biases have been taken to suggest that people are not good expected value maximizers and that
they are subject to irrationalities of choice that are counter to their own self-interest.
A highly critical appraisal of the “heuristics-and-biases” tradition has recently been provided by [25].
Indeed, recent research has begun to show that people may be more rational than supposed [26–30].
One type of bias in humans is known as a context-of-choice bias in which irrelevant options influence
decisions. For example, if a person chooses an apple over a cake on the grounds of health, but then
chooses the same cake when the choice is between an apple, the cake and another cake with extra
sugar, then the clearly inferior (on health grounds) “cake with extra sugar” has influenced the choice
between two superior alternatives. This is an example of where human choice between two options
changes when a third (dominated) alternative is introduced and there is significant empirical evidence
demonstrating this phenomenon [31]. As the dominated choice is irrelevant to the choice between the
other two options, it should have no effect on their valuation, nor on the choice. This effect has been
taken by some as evidence that human cognition is irrational since it appears to violate the normative
principles of independence. [32–34]. However, [35] has shown that these apparent irrationalities can
emerge from computationally rational mechanisms.
In the current paper, we propose an agent inspired by [35] demonstration that apparent irrationalities
of choice can emerge from rational processing. Our approach is an example of a broader class of
analysis known as Computational Rationality [26, 36, 28]. It extends [35] by modeling contextual
choice tasks as sequential decision problems and formulating them as Partially Observable Markov
Decision Processes (POMDPs). Previous work by [37, 38, 30, 39, 40] and others has established
the value of POMDPs and related formalisms for modeling humans. In our work, a reinforcement
learning agent, designed to solve a POMDP, acquires a sequential decision policy that chooses what
information to gather about which options, calculates option values, and makes comparisons between
options as the unfolding task demands. The agent is trained and tested on sampled choices between
three gambles, each expressed as a probability and a value. The agent learns the relative value of
(1) noisy calculation of option values (e.g. by multiplication of a probability by a value), (2) noisy
comparisons (e.g. comparing two probabilities to see which option is riskier), and (3) acting (making
a choice). The agent is not pre-programmed to gather all information but learns to gather only that
information that helps it maximize utility. We contrast this agent to other simpler agents and show
that the human-inspired agent performs better (achieves higher cumulative reward) than an agent
that makes independent assessments of each option value, replicating the results of [35] but in the
POMDP setting.
Our analysis of the new agent’s learned policy shows that it learns to use contextual information to help
infer which options approximately maximize expected value while taking into account computational
cost and cognitive limits. The agent’s performance shows that making use of contextual information
helps it make more accurate and efficient decisions under uncertainty while also giving rise to
apparently irrational and human-like decision making [35]. The work demonstrates that, under choice
uncertainty, there is economic value to ML agents of policies that make use of choice context and
relational judgments.
This paper’s contributions are as follows:
• It replicates the previous findings of [35] with a new problem formulation based on POMDPs;
it shows that preference reversals emerge from learning in a POMDP setting as well as in
the exhaustive search setting reported by [35].
• It provides further evidence that cognitive biases can inform ML. Model simulations demon-
strate that it is more profitable for an RL agent to take into account context and relational
judgments when choosing between uncertain options than to make independent evaluations
of each option, suggesting that in some circumstances RL agents should be designed with
the capacity to compare options.
• It extends the analysis of [35] to account for the impact of information gathering costs on
contextual choice.
• It makes novel predictions concerning optimal sequential information gathering in contextual
choice tasks. In particular, it shows how the ratio of option comparisons and expected value
calculations is influenced by the level of uncertainty in the observation functions.
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The paper is organised as follows, we first describe experiments revealing contextual choice effects in
human decision making and review theoretical accounts of human choice from the cognitive science
and neuroscience perspectives. We then define a contextual choice problem as a POMDP that includes
“comparison” observations and describe how to solve this POMDP with a reinforcement learning
agent. We test the agent on gamble tasks for which humans are known to be influenced by choice
context, and we demonstrate the correspondence between the approximately reward maximizing RL
behavior and human behavior - replicating [35]. Lastly, we analyse the agent’s sequential behaviour
and reveal the effect of observation noise on the frequency with which it uses option comparisons.
2 Background
2.1 The Effect of Choice Context on Humans
As we have said, the human behaviours that influence this paper are those exhibited in decision-
making tasks in which people appear biased by seemingly irrelevant context. Here we look in
more detail at these tasks and their effects. Contextual decision experiments have revealed many
robust empirical effects and contributed to shaping cognitive theories of human decision making
[32, 33, 35, 41–44]. Three of the most well known contextual decision task are the attraction,
compromise and similarity tasks. These are illustrated in Figure 1a, b, c. For the attraction type task,
there are two best options (the Target and the Competitor) with the very similar expected value. Each
option is best on one dimension but not the other. One of these two options (the Target) dominates
a third option, called the decoy, on both dimensions. It is difficult to choose between the two best
options since each option dominates the other on one of the attributes. Experiments studying these
three tasks have been reported by many authors. Consider the results of an experiment in which
participants were asked to make decisions about criminal suspects [45]. Participants were presented
with a sequence of tasks each consisting of three suspects and were asked to decide which suspect
was most likely to have committed a crime. There were two types of evidence, of varying strength,
about each of the three suspects, such that the suspects had likelihoods of criminality in patterns
identical to the three patterns presented in Figure 1d. These three patterns were used as the materials
in the three conditions of the experiment.
In the attraction condition of the experiment, there were two equally likely criminal suspects and a
decoy suspect who was less likely than the other two (Figure 1a). The experimental results showed
that the Target suspect who dominates the decoy was chosen more frequently than the Competitor
suspect. In the compromise condition of the experiment (Figure 1b) the findings showed that the
suspect who is in-between the Competitor and decoy is chosen more frequently than the Competitor.
In the similarity condition (Figure 1c), the results showed that the suspect who is very similar to the
decoy is chosen less frequently than the Competitor.
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Figure 1: (a)(b)(c) An illustration of the options in three types of contextual choice task – called
the attraction (a), compromise (b) and similarity (c) tasks. The Target T and Competitor C are two
options and have equal expected value (the dotted line). Option D is a decoy designed for comparison
with the Target T . In the attraction task (a), T dominates D. In the compromise task (b), T is a
compromise between D and T . In the similarity task (c), D has similar expected value to T . (d)
Proportion of choices of each of the three options (Target, Competitor and Decoy) in each of the the
three contextual choice tasks (Attraction, Compromise and Similarity). The Target is preferred in the
Attraction and Compromise tasks and the Competitor is preferred in the Similarity task. Data are
reproduced from [45].
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Human behaviour on these tasks has been seen as biased because the sensitivity to irrelevant context
(the decoy option) appears to have consequences for the choice between the other two options([34],
p. 1188). The most commonly used operationalization of irrationality among decision researchers
has been based on violations of value maximization. Preferring a dominated option or expressing
different preferences depending on the framing of options demonstrates irrational decisions. The
significance of any irrationality, if that is what they are, cannot be understated given the potential
for catastrophic real world consequences. However, the conclusion that choice under uncertainty
provides evidence of irrationality may be incorrect [35, 46]. Substantive analysis of the value of
comparing options has shown that they are in fact informative and are required, under conditions of
uncertainty, for reward maximization [35]. The substantive structure of these analyses has informed
the design of the agent that we present below. The key cognitive strategy that is borrowed from human
behaviour is the use of option comparison to inform decision making under uncertainty. Comparison
was extensively explored by Stewart [47, 48] who has documented extensive of its use in a range of
human decision making tasks. For example, there is eye tracking evidence [49] that people tend to
make more eye movements that switch between options than eye movements that gather all of the
evidence about a single option; evidence which is consistent with the use of comparisons.
2.2 Human Decision Making as a POMDP
POMDPs provide a mathematical framework for sequential decision processes [50]. POMDPs
have previously been used for modelling and explaining various aspects of human decision making
[51, 37, 38]. An early contribution was [51]’s model of the dopamine system which incorporated
semi-Markov dynamics and partial observability. [38] proposed a model of neural information
processing based on POMDPs and tested this model on perceptual tasks such as the random dot
motion task. Further work in perceptual decision making, has used the POMDP framing to explore
model confidence [52] and understand the role of priors [53]. POMDPs have even been used to model
social decision making [54]. More recently, meta-level Markov decision processes (meta-MDP), a
closely related framework, have been used for modelling higher level decision making [55]. The
Meta-MDP model is similar to the belief-MDP version of the POMDP, but replacing physical actions
with cognitive operations. Meta-MDPs have been used to model strategy selection and heuristics in
decision making [39] and attention allocation in perception [56].
Contextual preference reversals have influenced a number of models of human decision making
[32, 33, 41, 30, 57, 43, 42, 41]. Many of these models have focused on neurally plausible sequential
processing, capturing the fact that decision making usually requires accumulation of evidence and
integration of information across time [46]. Other models have focused on the way that people solve
this problem by sampling comparisons between option attributes and thereby impose a rank order on
options [42]. However, none to our knowledge, have shown that preference reversals are an emergent
consequence of an RL solution to a POMDP.
3 Contextual Choice as a POMDP
We view contextual choice tasks as sequential decision making problems and formulate them as
POMDPs that include, in the action space, comparison actions to assess choice option values. Given
this formulation, we use a deep reinforcement learning model to discover an approximately optimal
choice policy and demonstrate its capacity to simultaneously maximize reward and model humans. A
crucial property of the model is that gathering information is costly, so that more information costs
more but also increases the probability of a better, more rewarding, choice.
We start with a standard definition of a POMDP as a tuple (S,A,O, T ,Z,R, γ), where S is the
state space, A is the action space, and O is the observation space. At each time step t the agent is in
the latent state st ∈ S, which is not directly observable to the agent. When the agent executes an
action at ∈ A, the state of the process changes stochastically according to the transition distribution,
st ∼ T (st+1|st, at). Then, to gather information about the state, the agent makes a partial observation
ot+1 ∈ O according to the distribution ot+1 ∼ Z(ot+1|st+1, at). The agent received a reward rt+1 ∈
R according to the distribution rt+1 ∼ R(ot+1|st+1, at) after performing an action at in a particular
state st+1. The agent must rely on its observations to inform action selection since the hidden states
are not directly observable. In each time step t, the agent acts according to its policy pi(at|ht) which
returns the probability of executing action at, and where ht = (o0, a0, o1, a1, · · · ot−1, at−1) are the
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histories of observations-actions pairs. The goal of the agent is to learn an optimal policy pi∗ that
maximizes the expected cumulative rewards, pi∗ = argmax
pi
E
[∑t=T
t=1 γ
t−1rt
]
, where 0 < γ < 1 is
the discount factor.
Each choice task had 3 options (X, Y, Z) which were represented with two attributes: a randomly
sampled probability p and a randomly sampled value v. We assumed that probabilities p were
sampled from a β−distribution and values v were sampled from a t−distribution. These distributions
represented the ecological distributions experienced by participants in the human behaviour experi-
ments reported by [31]. We view contextual choice tasks as sequential decision making problems and
formulate them as POMDPs as follows.
The state space S for each task was generated from a sampled choice task. More formally a state
was {(pX , vX), (pY , vY ), (pZ , vZ)}, where probabilities p were sampled from a β−distribution
and values v were sampled from a t−distribution. The agent selected actions from a set A which
included 6 comparison actions (e.g. compute the comparison relation for pX and pY ), 3 calculation
actions (e.g. compute the expected value for X given pX and vX ) and the 3 choice actions (choose X,
choose Y, choose Z). The reward for comparison and calculation actions was negative c. The reward
for a choice action was 10 if the agent chose the option with maximum expected value, otherwise,
it was -10. There was therefore a trade-off between the cost of information gathering and choice
accuracy. More information cost more but was more likely to lead to a better response and therefore
a higher reward. As a consequence of the selected action, the subsequent observation ot+1 ∈ O was
of computing the most recent comparison or calculation with noise. Following [35] each observation
of a comparison had 4 possible outcomes, which indicated that the relation was unknown, greater,
equal and less. The function f represents this pairwise order relation between the two values or two
probabilities of two gambles. The probability of comparison error P (errorf ) was the probability
that the relations were sampled uniformly random from the comparison set O = {>,≡, <}. The
observation of a calculation was computed using:
Ei = p
α
i × vi + ε ε ∼ N(0, σ2calc) (1)
where the probability p was weighted by an exponential parameter α. The purpose of using parameter
α is to model subjective probability following [58]. The exponential is used to model subjective
probability is extensively in econometrics because it is mathematically well behaved.
The evidence state is the history of the partial and noisy observation of the latent state. The history of
observation set Oh is the noisy encoding of the partial orderings of probabilities and values:
Oh = {f(pX , pY ), f(pX , pZ), f(pY , pZ), f(vX , vY ), f(vX , vZ), f(vY , vZ), EX , EY , EZ} (2)
It is intractable to compute a policy to solve the defined POMDP, but it is possible to approximate
the optimum through learning [59–61]. We solve the POMDP by casting it as a Markov Decision
Process (MDP) whose state space is the history of observation oh. We used a deep reinforcement
learning method, called ACER, to find an approximately optimal policy for the POMDP [62]. For
all reported experiments, we built the environments within OpenAI Gym [63] and used the OpenAI
Baselines 1 implementation of the deep RL algorithms.
4 Results
In order to test the model, we designed three different agents: The integrated agent could use both
calculation and comparison selectively. States represent the results of calculation and comparison
actions. The model can learn which observations are useful and not every observation needs to
be made. There is no explicit integration of comparison and calculation. Instead, the results of
comparison and calculation accumulate in the history and choice action values are conditional on
these histories. The comparison-only agent is same as the integrated agent but could only use
comparison actions, and there are states only represent the comparison information. The calculation-
only agent is same as the integrated agent but could only use calculation actions and, there are states
only represent the calculation information. The difference between the three models is the availability
to use two kinds of observation information. All three agents learnt approximately optimal policies
from experience.
1https://github.com/openai/baselines
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Figure 2: The mean expected value obtained by agents with different levels of noise: the coefficient of
variation for the calculation noise (left panel) and the probability of comparison error (right panel). In
the left panel, the comparison noise is fixed at Perror = 0.3. In the right panel, the calculation noise
is fixed at δcalc = 30, that the coefficient of variation is 0.3. Results for 3 types of agent are presented
in each panel: the comparison-only agent (green-doted line), calculation-only agent (blue-doted line)
and integrated agent (black-doted line). This Figure replicates Figure 3 in [35].
Figure 3: The integrated agent exhibits the attraction effect. A sample of agents was tested on each
of four variants of the attraction effect task (in which the decoy is in slightly different positions).
People and agent exhibit more target choices than Competitor choices in task sets 1, 2, and 3. As
expected, neither the integrated agent, nor people, exhibit the effect in task set 4 where the decoy was
not dominated by only one of the options and was therefore in a neutral position. Task 4 thereby acts
as a control The human data is from [31]. The error bars indicate confidence interval (95%) of the
predictions made by the agent. This Figure replicates Figure 8 in [35].
In what follows we first show that our new reinforcement learning model replicates previous findings
[35] and then show that it makes new predictions derived from the sequential nature of the model.
Is it Beneficial to Compare Options? In order to answer this question, we first fitted the distributions
of the environment to those used in a prominent human experiment [31]. The probabilities p are
β−distributed (a = 1, b = 1) and the values v are t−distributed (location = 19.60, scale =
5, degree of freedom = 100). For all the experiments below, we used the same distributions.
Reported results are averaged over 10 runs, each with a different seed, after training on 3 million
samples. All the details on setup and learning curves can be found in the supplementary material.
All agents were tested with different levels of observation noise and the resulting performance is
shown in Figure 2. The maximum expected value that could be achieved by any agent was 16.29
(horizontal upper bound in Figure 2), which was calculated by averaging the maximum expected
value of 3 options across 1 million choice sets sampled from the above distributions.
In Figure 2 it can be seen that the integrated agent, using both calculation and comparison observations,
can approximate the optimal policy when actions could be conducted without noise. Also, calculation-
based and comparison-based agents are able to perform close to optimum when there is no noise.
However, the noise has a negative effect on the performance of all types of agent. The average
obtained value of choices decreases as noise increases.
Figure 2 also shows that the integrated agent combines the strengths of both noisy comparison and
noisy calculation to make better decisions than the other agents in all noise conditions. The average
expected value of the choices made by the integrated agent is greater than the other agents. In
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Figure 4: (a) The behaviour of the integrated agent for 3 types of context effect: attraction, compro-
mise and similarity. (b)(c)(d) The effect of noise and computational cost on the contextual choice
effect exhibited by the integrated agent. (b) Increased comparison noise reduces the effect size, (c)
increased calculation noise increases the effect size, and (d) increased computational cost reduces the
effect size. Error bars indicate (95%) confidence interval.
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Figure 5: Effect of noise and computational cost on number of comparison and calculation actions
taken. The analysis shows that the model chooses observations selectively depending on their utility.
other words, the human-like integrated agent performs better in accumulating reward than the agent
that makes independent assessments of each option value. The results suggest that when there is
observation uncertainty, both humans and artificial agents will gain higher reward if they compare
options, rather than merely evaluate each option independently.
Does the Integrated Agent Predict Human Performance? To determine whether the integrated
agent (the agent that uses both comparison and calculation) predicts human performance, we measured
its behaviour on the the attraction, compromise and similarity tasks. The human behaviour on these
tasks is shown in Figure 1d. We used one fixed setting of the agent policy and parameter values.
Agents were trained on tasks which were randomly sampled from a β−distribution (a = 1, b = 1)
for the probability p and t−distribution (location = 19.60, scale = 8.08, df = 100) for the value v.
After 3 million training samples, the agent converged and demonstrated stable performance. The agent
was repeatedly trained with adjusted values of the comparison noise, calculation noise, probability
weighting parameters, cost of comparisons and calculation cost until the qualitative effects fitted the
human performance ([45]; Figure 1d). The fitted parameter values were: calculation noise σcalc = 4,
comparison error P (errorf ) = 0.1, probability weighting parameters α = 1, the perceived cost of
comparison Ccomparison = −0.01 and the calculation cost Ccalc = −0.1. We do not claim to have
achieved the best possible fit, nor a better fit than other models. The point of the fit was to show
that the qualitative effects exhibited by humans was within the space of behaviours generated by the
agent.
The results are averaged over 10 runs with different seed and shown in Figure 4a. It shows that the
agent generates the three context effects using one learnt policy and one fixed set of parameter values.
Comparison of Figure 4a to Figure 1d) shows that all of the qualitative effects are predicted.
To further test the agent we fitted it to variations of the attraction effect in human performance
[31]. The fitted values were: calculation noise σcalc = 0.50, comparison error P (errorf ) = 0.1,
probability weighting parameters α = 1.5, the perceive cost of comparison features Ccomparison =
−0.01 and the calculation cost Ccalc = −0.1. The results in Figure 3 show that for both agents and
people, the Target is selected more often than the Competitor in three of the task sets (1, 2, and 3). In
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contrast, and as expected, the Target and Competitor are selected equally often in the 4th task set by
both agents and people. The decoy was positioned in a neutral position in task set 4 and does not
therefore have an effect on the target choice rate.
Does the Uncertainty of Information Influence the Decision Process? We tested the consequences
of noise on choice. The results in Figure 4b, c, d show that: (1) The size of attraction effect decreases
as computational cost increases, (2) the attraction effect is weaker when the agent’s accuracy of
comparison is diminished with noise, (3) The effect is stronger when calculation noise is higher.
While, there is no human data that directly tests the effect of noise. There are a number of studies
reporting that the rate of context effect diminishes with time pressure increases [64, 57]. As shown in
Figure 4b, c, d, the effects of time pressure on humans is consistent with the effect of increased noise
in the model.
What are the Effects of Noise and Computation Cost? The effect of noise on the number of
comparisons and calculation actions taken is shown in Figure 5. Increases in comparison noise leads
to a selective reduction in the use of comparison and a selective increase in the use of calculation.
Conversely, increases in calculation noise leads to a selective decrease in the use of calculation and an
increase in the use of comparison. Increase in the cost of information gathering actions (comparison
and expected value) reduces contextual effects on choice (Figure 5c) as less information is gathered.
5 Discussion
While ours is not the first work to demonstrate the rationality of preference reversal phenomena
[35], nor the first work to use POMDPs to model humans [51, 38]), it is the first to formulate the
contextual choice problem as a POMDP and demonstrate that a reinforcement learning agent that uses
comparison observations generates higher reward than an agent that makes independent assessments
of value. These comparison actions, when deployed by people, have been thought by many to violate
independence axioms. They have been shown to underpin preference reversals in humans [49]. As
has previously been pointed out, this seemingly paradoxical result makes sense when it is appreciated
that the comparison of options reduces the uncertainty of option values.
Further, extending [35], we have demonstrated that the same pattern of behaviours that are thought to
be irrational in humans, will emerge from a learning process that attempts to maximize the cumulative
reward of action. Further, our results show that comparison actions are preferred by the agent as
observation noise increases (in previous models comparisons have been assumed) and we have also
shown that higher information gathering costs can diminish the use of comparisons and reduce
the preference reversal rate; thereby extending previous analysis to account for the economics of
information gathering in contextual choice tasks.
The approach that we have taken in this paper is an example of a broader class of analysis known
as Computational Rationality [26, 36, 28]. This approach starts from the assumption that people
are approximately rational given the bounds imposed by the computation required for cognition
[26, 39, 65]. It then seeks to discover the computational limits that give rise to boundedly optimal
[66] but apparently irrational behaviours. This aim demands that the analyst derive bounded optimal
policies for well-formed decision problems. Our results suggest an answer to the paradox of why
it is worth motivating machine learning algorithms with apparently biased human decision making.
While the behaviour appears biased, the underlying processes and heuristics (e.g. the use of option
comparison) lead to gains in efficiency and therefore reward.
6 Conclusion
Machine learning researchers can take inspiration from apparent human irrationalities. This claim is
supported by our demonstration that reinforcement learning agents that seek to maximize cumulative
reward when observations are uncertain can improve performance by selectively comparing option
values and not merely making independent assessments of each option. This human-like processing
appears irrational but is demonstrably rational under bounds imposed by uncertainty in the observation
function.
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Broader Impact
The current work is potentially influential on the future of how RL is used in systems designed to
understand and interact with humans. It may have positive ethical implications by virtue of the
fact that it enhances the scientific understanding of the relationship between human and machine
information gathering and decision processes. We have no reason to believe that the data used to train
and validate the model is biased in a way that would disadvantage protected or minority groups on
the basis of race or gender.
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